Introduction
This document describes the use of AES [AES] in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [GCM] (AES-GCM) with various key exchange mechanisms as a ciphersuite for TLS. AES-GCM is not only efficient and secure, but hardware implementations can achieve high speeds with low cost and low latency, because the mode can be pipelined. Applications like CAPWAP, which uses DTLS, can benefit from the high-speed implementations when wireless termination points (WTPs) and controllers (ACs) have to meet requirements to support higher throughputs in the future. AES-GCM has been specified as a mode that can be used with IPsec ESP [RFC4106] and 802.1AE MAC Security [IEEE8021AE] . This document defines ciphersutes based on RSA, DSS and Diffie-Hellman key exchanges; ECC based ciphersuites are defined in a separate document [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac]. AES-GCM is an authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) cipher, as defined in TLS 1.2 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]. The ciphersuites defined in this draft may be used with Datagram TLS defined in [RFC4347] . This memo uses GCM in a way similar to [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac].
Conventions Used In This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] 3. AES-GCM Cipher Suites associated data (AEAD) algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM described in [RFC5116] . Note that each of these AEAD algorithms uses a 128-bit authentication tag with GCM. The "nonce" SHALL be 12 bytes long and it is "partially implicit" (see section 3.2.1 in [RFC5116] ). Part of the nonce is generated as part of the handshake process and is static for the entire session and the other part is carried in each packet.
Struct{ opaque salt[4]; opaque explicit_nonce_part[8]; } GCMNonce
The salt is the "implicit" part of the nonce and is not sent in the packet. It is either the client_write_IV if the client is sending or the server_write_IV if the server is sending. These IVs SHALL be 4 bytes long, therefore, for all the algorithms defined in this section, SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length=4.
The explicit_nonce_part is chosen by the sender and included in the packet. Each value of the explicit_nonce_part MUST be distinct for each distinct invocation of GCM encrypt function for any fixed key. Failure to meet this uniqueness requirement can significantly degrade security. The explicit_nonce_part is carried in the IV field of the GenericAEADCipher structure. For all the algorithms defined in this section, SecurityParameters.record_iv_length=8. The PRF algorithms SHALL be as follows:
For ciphersuites ending in _SHA256 the hash function is SHA256.
For ciphersuites ending in _SHA384 the hash function is SHA384.
TLS Versions
These ciphersuites make use of the authenticated encryption with additional data defined in TLS 
Security Considerations
The security considerations in [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis] apply to this document as well. The remainder of this section describes security considerations specific to the cipher suites described in this document.
Counter Reuse
AES-GCM security requires that the counter is never reused. The IV construction in Section 3 is designed to prevent counter reuse.
Recommendations for Multiple Encryption Processors
If multiple cryptographic processors are in use by the sender, then the sender MUST ensure that, for a particular key, each value of the explicit_nonce_part used with that key is distinct. In this case each encryption processor SHOULD include in the explicit_nonce_part a fixed value that is distinct for each processor. where the FixedDistinct field is distinct for each encryption processor, but is fixed for a given processor, and the Variable field is distinct for each distinct nonce used by a particular encryption processor. When this method is used, the FixedDistinct fields used by the different processors MUST have the same length.
In the terms of Figure 2 in [RFC5116] , the Salt is the Fixed-Common part of the nonce (it is fixed, and it is common across all encryption processors), the FixedDistinct field exactly corresponds to the Fixed-Distinct field, and the Variable field corresponds to the Counter field, and the explicit part exactly corresponds to the explicit_nonce_part.
For clarity, we provide an example for TLS in which there are two distinct encryption processors, each of which uses a one-byte FixedDistinct field:
(for the first encryption processor) FixedDistinct = 02 (for the second encryption processor)
The GCMnonces generated by the first encryption processor, and their corresponding explicit_nonce_parts, are: eedc68dc0100000000000000  0100000000000000  eedc68dc0100000000000001  0100000000000001  eedc68dc0100000000000002 0100000000000002 ... The GCMnonces generated by the second encryption processor, and their corresponding explicit_nonce_parts, are 
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